Black Death on the Black Sea


This is a rescues post: a Twitter thread salvaged as Twitter goes under, an essay I meant to extend. Better here, as is, than hidden in my files.

I remain concerned about how new work on the origins of the Black Death is going to set medievalists and other people talking about Mongol history. We know what happens when diseases are associated with foreigners. But, as with the turn towards the Global Middle Ages, Mongol history can also flower under new attention.

Incident at Caffa: Mongols lobbing plague dead into the enemy? Not likely

First, my Twitter thread on the incident at Caffa. Context — the murder of a Mongol:

The most serious episode, which ushered in a long period of hostilities between Genoese and Venetians on one side and Janibeg Khan (r. 1342-57) on the other, occurred in 1343 as a consequence of the Venetian refusal to deliver to Mongol authorities a Venetian nobleman, Andreolo Civran, who had been found guilty of having ambushed and slain a Mongol with whom he had previously had an altercation. The subsequent turmoil all but wiped out the Italian presence on the Black Sea, forcing the Franks (that is, the Italians) to flee Tana to save their lives and seek refuge in Caffa. Caffa, however, was attacked, besieged, and nearly taken by the army of Janibeg. This episode is famously known for the connection between the Mongols bombardment of Caffa with infected corpses and animal carcasses and the spread of the Black Death that ravaged Europe.

— Nicola Di Cosmo, ‘Black Sea emporia and the Mongol Empire: A reassessment of the Pax Mongolica’


me on a Twitter rant:

[searches Twitter for ‘Mongols’ + ‘Black Death’] We so need to dislodge the factoid ‘first recorded use of biological warfare’ from people’s heads. The one source is a complaint full of rhetorical flourish from a stay-at-home lawyer in Italy. Consider his ignorance and prejudice.
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We need to be source-critical and not just re-tell a grisly tale for the same reason Gabriele de’ Mussis told it: for the shock-horror, to appease readers’ cravings and transmit our own texts on the back of a grisly story. We need to do lit-crit on de Mussis in our history books.
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But instead, historians themselves (Mongolists not excluded) revel in the war-and-gore tale and only want to tell it again to the kids.
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It matters because ‘first recorded use of biological warfare’ is lodged in heads, all over the internet, accepted in reputable books, and one of the basic factoids people ‘learn’ [in quote marks] about Mongol history. While it doesn’t stand up to any source criticism at all…
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Even May (found in agreement with Dr Green’s new work on marmots, Issyk Kul origins & plague as a factor in the collapse of Mongol states) — in an otherwise excellent chapter on ‘Mongols and Plague’, licks his lips at this story and dives in. He calculates body splatter range.
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Instead of interrogating Gabriele de’ Mussis and his prose-poem of blame for the plague.
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Such sensationalism is *exactly what we have to avoid* now that Dr Green’s stellar work has made Mongols and the Black Death an inevitably big talking-point and, once again, a main way into Mongol history. We don’t want a ‘Mongol plague’ language now — after de Mussis’ Tartars.
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I can see the talking-points about Mongols eating rodents. Wet markets, anyone?
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So let’s at least avoid historians’ disgust when discussing Mongol eating habits. It’s easy to express disgust in that not-so-neutral, not-so-measured historians’ style. We have to try not to replicate attitudes of 13thC European travelers on rat-eating, even while we quote them.
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Like, it’s easy to write without disgust or a laugh on what historical Mongols ate and why. But writers seem to find it easy to imagine eating marmot or rats, screw up their faces and smirk in collusion with the reader. Don’t do that? Write straight-faced. Imagine historically.
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Download Dr Monica H. Green’s The Four Plagues. For the moment, still read Timothy May on The Mongols and Plague, which stands up well enough after Dr Green (but ask questions — always).
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Dr Barker lays our meme to rest. A reconstruction of Caffa from Byzantine, Genoese, Venetian, Mamluk residents and travelers. ‘Laying the Corpses to Rest: Grain, Embargoes, and Yersinia pestis in the Black Sea, 1346–48’ Hannah Barker, Speculum 96.1 Jan 2021

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Yesterday-today have read Dr Barker. Along with Dr Green’s intervention, it’s conclusive. Ends: ‘Plague’s movement across the Black Sea was certainly not a matter of bioterrorism during the siege of Caffa. Instead, it was an unintended consequence of peace.’
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[end thread]

 

What was lost to plague? or, a lament for the Pax Mongolica and its other, forgotten Marco Polos

The Black Death of 1347-50 began on the Black Sea, for Europe. Before the great pestilence, Genoese were the most heavily involved of Europeans with the Mongol world beyond the Black Sea. This essay looks at Italian contacts with farther Asia, and the effects of the plague on these contacts. Mongol states suffered in the plague and lost their ability to facilitate trade; for Italian merchants, who had travelled with unprecedented freedom through this world, farther Asia was again cut off. Cultural interchanges were lost, and even knowledge of them was often lost to sight in a post-plague world, except as preserved in popular romances. Italian art also testifies to an engagement with farther Asia in the later thirteenth and the early fourteenth centuries, before the plague. Thus we need to turn to paintings and romance, in order to see the before and after, and assess the effects of the plague. This very trade between the Italian merchant republics and the Mongols was understood to be the agent of transmission of the plague to Europe; the Genoese feature in chronicles as shipping plague from port to port. It is a sad end to a story of exchange and openness between Asia and Europe in the medieval age.

For a century before the great plague of 1347-50, the Pax Mongolica was in effect. The whole Mongol world was open for trade, into farther Asia – that is, beyond what touches the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Previous states in these areas, running on principles of settled peoples, had not allowed foreigners to travel freely in their interiors, and they had their own merchants whose commercial interests to protect. Not so Mongols, who took every means possible to attract foreign merchants and facilitated their travel through the vast spaces in which they had demolished borders.1 The four khans’ territories were loose-knit; the Ilkhans in Iran and the khans of the Golden Horde above the Black and Caspian Seas were political rivals, at times at war. Nevertheless, neither government let this disrupt the transit trade, or punished each other through trade access as is usual for non-nomad states. Trade was of the first concern to Mongols. Janet Abu-Lughod has seen in this century, A.D. 1250-1350, an emergent ‘world system’ of trade connections; Roxann Prazniak, who studies Italian-Asian contacts, talks of a ‘Mongol world century’ with these same dates.2 It ends around the date of the Black Death.

Italians moved confidently in the Mongol world. They negotiated with Mongol governments, made treaties, stood up for their rights, quarrelled with Mongols and entered into armed conflict.3 They are found as individuals in service at the court of the Ilkhans; in a Genoese Quarter in the Ilkhans’ capital Tabriz; a brother and a sister, guessed to be Genoese, have tombstones in the port city of Zayton (Quanzhou) in China, where lived a Latin community.4 Genoa had won a struggle with Venice for the lion’s share of trading opportunities in the Mongol world. Its operations on the Black Sea can be described as a partnership or a symbiosis with the Golden Horde Mongols – the ‘closest recorded working relationship’ between a European and an Asian state in the medieval age.5 Unfortunately, the far-travelled Genoese left few records of their activities, in part due to commercial secrecy and a preference for oral information.6 None of these exploratory merchants and adventurers met the accidents that led the Venetian Marco Polo to divulge his experiences. Other reasons for the quiet of the records have been adduced: vital to Genoa’s trade arrangements between the Golden Horde and Egypt was the shipping of slaves to be mamlukes from one to the other. This service, a necessity for the Dawla al-Turkiyya (‘The State of the Turks’) in Egypt and its Mongol ally, was not a matter for the European go-betweens to boast of; if merchants chose to major in this trade, they did not keep the accounts they did for other merchandise.7

The plague coincided with and in part caused the close-down of trade with farther Asia and the end of the Pax Mongolica. The Golden Horde had been over a diplomatic barrel; the khans in Saray had often displayed a reluctance to export their own population, but strategy required they satisfy this unique need of Egypt for new slave soldiers from the steppe, in order to keep Egypt as an ally against their rival Ilkhans.8 Plague depopulated the Golden Horde and this sacrifice of people became unconscionable for the Saray khans.9 Plague, at the same time, helped the descent of the Ilkhans’ state into chaos, which ended the diplomatic triangle, and the Golden Horde’s attitude towards its Genoese trading partners on the Black Sea underwent a change. It did not have to do business with them in the old ways, and resentments over the slave trade became evident.10

As Nicola di Cosmo observes, the Genoese on the Black Sea in fact had a strengthened hand against a debilitated Golden Horde after the plague, and their colony cities gained in sovereign rights.11 However, farther Asia was cut off, as Mongol states in Iran (1340s onwards) and China (the two decades up to 1368) collapsed – both, it has been argued, victims of the plague.12 There is a distinction to be made between Genoa’s government and its private merchants: the government had never pursued opportunities to extend its activities east; even Mongol offers for diplomatic exchange were not taken up.13 The Genoese government was content to exploit the immediate Black Sea surrounds, that had been familiar European places for trade and slave acquisition since the Greek colonies in ancient times.14 Ventures into farther Asia had been of private initiative. Privately led and funded enterprises were a mark of Genoese ways of doing business; Benjamin Kedar contrasts the traits ascribed to Genoese and Venetians in the contemporary view, with the Genoese individualistic and resistant to state control.15 Indeed, Genoese resident on the Black Sea were known to disobey the home government when its orders interfered with trade.16 These differences can help explain Genoa’s deeper engagement with Asia. It was individual exploits, self-organised, that struck out beyond the purview of the Genoese state. After the plague on the Black Sea, the more conservative trade interests of Genoa’s government held sway: just as in post-plague Europe, trade became localised and distance trade suffered. Di Cosmo lists the retained merchandise from local sources: fish, caviar, timber, hides – not the conspicuous ‘Tartar cloth’, or nasij in the Mongol world, gold-embroidered brocades.17 In Kedar’s study of Genoese and Venetian merchant mentalities in the fourteenth-century depression, the evidence indicates retrenchment, safe bets, low aims.18 Steven Epstein writes similarly in his history of medieval Genoa: he farewells ‘the earlier, heroic age of merchant entrepreneurs’ for a risk-averse climate after the plague: ‘the Genoese do seem collectively to have lost their intrepid spirit… nothing would be heard of China for a long time.’19

To see what was lost in the post-plague world, we need a view of the world before the plague: so Kedar reasons when he sets out to assess the fourteenth-century depression.20 This is true of Italy’s engagement with the east. With the interruption of the plague and the closure of farther Asia, knowledge too went into retrenchment, and the engagement of Italy with Asia was lost sight of – even into the scholarship today. Art history is one road to rediscovery of how close these worlds once were. Fourteenth-century Italian painting has been plumbed for evidence of Asian influence.21 Most strikingly, Roxann Prazniak has detected in the paintings of Ambrogio Lorenzetti of Siena, on the eve of the Black Death in the 1340s, a direct imitation of art styles in Tabriz, the ‘world historical’ city of the Ilkhans, as well as an intelligent commentary on Mongol conditions in one work set at a Central Asian court.22 Meanwhile, art historians of the period of Mongol rule in Iran trace Italian influences there.23 Prazniak’s ongoing investigations are at the forefront of Italian-Mongol cultural links.

After the plague, there is also reminiscence in romance. That ‘heroic age’ of mercantile Genoese before the post-plague depression is captured in romance, which in the thirteenth century took a turn to Asia, as known through merchant travellers. Michael Murrin, in his book Trade and Romance, argues that the new Asian settings, first inspired by Marco Polo, continued to be fuelled by the experiences, the real adventures – and the interests – of non-aristocratic travellers for commerce, even though the heroes remained knights.24 Chaucer set his Squire’s Tale in Saray, capital of the Golden Horde. This tale has proven to be well-informed about the Mongol world, with its most extravagant fantasies anchored in actual events, historical stories, material items.25 Murrin posits that Chaucer heard tales of the Golden Horde from Genoese merchants, in the later decades of the fourteenth century.26 Inexplicable, otherwise, is his idealisation of Chinggis Khan (Cambyuskan) as an exemplary monarch – a portrait matched elsewhere only by Marco Polo’s eulogy on Chinggis.27 Marco Polo took a Mongol view of things and may scarcely have felt European. Residents among the Mongols were open to this foreign world: the Squire’s Tale, written on Genoese intelligence, stands as proof. It contrasts with a view from home: the doges of Genoa and Venice, in correspondence with each other in 1345, ‘vent their real feelings’ on the Tartars – insulting and estranged.28 In a later reminiscence, from 1495, Matteo Maria Boiardo’s Italianised Roland makes friends with a Tartar king whose characterisation also invokes (good) qualities told of Chinggis Khan.29 Boiardo’s open Asia is more that of the Pax Mongolica than of his present-day; while the Squire’s Tale envisages a golden age in the Golden Horde. These are the memories of merchants, preserved in romance; an evidence not to be neglected.

Within Europe, the picture is quite different. The alliterative Morte Arthure, with a date close to the Squire’s Tale at the end of the fourteenth century, has King Arthur slay a baby-spitting giant from Genoa.30 The Genoese in Europe lived in disrepute, very often – this is the theme of David Wallace’s study of Genoa as a place in the imagination, then and now.31 Now, in the historical imagination: Abu-Lughod notes the ‘inequal treatment in the literature’ of Venice and Genoa, when these were equivalent in importance in the thirteenth century.32 Genoa’s connections with the little-understood Tartars, with the slave trade, with ambivalently-seen wealth from the east, must have fed into this unsavoury image. Then, they were blamed for shipping the plague. Its very transmission to Europeans was located at Genoese Caffa on the Black Sea, besieged by Tartars in a quarrel over a murder. The tale of Gabriele de’ Mussis in his Historia de Morbo need not be taken at face value: both shamanists and Muslims had ways to dispose of dead, which didn’t include lobbing them at the enemy; in the khan’s plague-stricken army despair might have set in, over religious concerns.33 Whether true or not, this is the tale that went around, with the declamation of de’ Mussis: ‘Speak, Genoa, of what you have done.’34 Next, Genoese ships feature in chronicles around the coasts of Europe as bringers of the terrible disease. ‘Tartars’, ‘Caffa’, ‘ships of Genoa’ recur as Europe records its history of transmission of the plague in the year 1347.35 Of the course of the plague in Genoa itself, Epstein finds absolutely no local records.36 But Genoese, and their eastwards trade with Tartars, acquired the ill-fame of afflicting Europe with the great pestilence known as the Black Death. There seems to be a split view, of Genoese as of Tartars: a golden age, a Pax Mongolica, remembered by the merchants involved; and the scapegoating of these Europeans who had truck and traffic with such a foreign world – before the plague.

The Black Death, from a European perspective, began on the Black Sea, an unfortunate contact between the adventurous Genoese merchants and the Mongol world that welcomed them. It must be seen against the contacts that existed in a world before the plague, where Italians travelled into Mongol Iran and Mongol China. They left few records – Marco Polo is a stand-out – and the evidence of them often lies in cultural exchanges, in Italian art influenced by art styles in Tabriz, in romances that know the Mongol world through the tales of these travellers. The great pestilence of 1346-50 interfered with trade, helped reduce the Mongol states to chaos, and left affairs on the Black Sea to the more conservative Genoese government, instead of private, exploratory ventures farther into Asia. The trade itself, the connection of Genoa and the Mongols, was seen as the agent of this catastrophic disease. The closest cooperation between Europe and Asia, in the medieval period, was over.

Further reading

My blog post Mongols and the Plague: mostly about Mongol understandings of disease and contagion.

My blog post Chaucer Goes to the Golden Horde: on the Squire’s Tale and its Mongol knowledge.

Roxann Prazniak, often mentioned in this essay, has since published a book about the interconnected Mongol world. Here’s my review for the Asian Review of Books.

My review of Jo Ann Cavallo’s The World Beyond Europe in the Romance Epics of Boiardo and Ariosto, where I get excited about meeting a sympathetic Mongol khan in Italian romance; and of Michael Murrin’s Trade and Romance, for when romance changed from the ‘Celtic fantastic’ to the ‘marvelous real’, whose tutelary spirit was Marco Polo.

 

Bibliography and footnotes

Abu-Lughod, Janet L., Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989.

Allsen, Thomas T., Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire: A Cultural History of Islamic Textiles, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Blair, Sheila, ‘The Religious Art of the Ilkhanids’, in The Legacy of Genghis Khan: Courtly Art and Culture in Western Asia, 1256-1353, eds. Linda Komaroff and Stefano Carboni, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 104-33.

Braud, David, ‘The Slave Supply in Classical Greece’, in The Cambridge World History of Slavery, Volume 1: The Ancient Mediterranean World, eds. Keith Bradley and Paul Cartledge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 112-33.

Cavallo, Jo Ann, The World Beyond Europe in the Romance Epics of Boiardo and Ariosto, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2013.

Childs, Wendy, ‘Anglo-Italian Contacts in the Fourteenth Century’, in Chaucer and the Italian Trecento, ed. Piero Boitani, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 65-87.

Ciocîltan, Virgil, The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, trans. Samuel Willcocks, Leiden, Brill, 2012.

Di Cosmo, Nicola, ‘Black Sea emporia and the Mongol Empire: A reassessment of the Pax Mongolica’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 53, iss. 1-2, 2009, pp. 83-108.

Di Cosmo, Nicola, ‘Mongols and Merchants on the Black Sea Frontier in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: Convergences and Conflicts’, in Mongols, Turks and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World, eds. Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran, Leiden, Brill, 2005, pp. 391-424.

Epstein, Steven A., Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528, Chapel Hill and London, University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

Epstein, Steven A., Purity Lost: Transgressing Boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1000-1400, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 2006.

Ho, Colleen, ‘Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century European-Mongol Relations’, History Compass, vol. 10, iss. 12, 2012, pp. 946-68.

Horrox, Rosemary, The Black Death, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1994.

Jordan, Carmel, ‘Soviet Archeology and the Setting of the Squire’s Tale’, The Chaucer Review, vol. 22, iss. 2, 1987, pp. 128-9.

Kedar, Benjamin Z., Merchants in Crisis: Genoese and Venetian Men of Affairs and the Fourteenth-Century Depression, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1976.

Korobeinikov, Dimitri, ‘A Broken Mirror: The Kipchak World in the Thirteenth Century’, in The Other Europe in the Middle Ages: Avars, Bulgars, Khazars, and Cumans, ed. Florin Curta, Leiden, Brill, 2008.

Lach, Donald F., Asia in the Making of Europe, Volume 1: The Century of Discovery, Book One, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1965.

May, Timothy, The Mongol Conquests in World History, London, Reaktion, 2012.

McKee, Sally, ‘Domestic slavery in Renaissance Italy’, Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies, vol. 29, iss. 3, 2008, pp. 305-326.

Murrin, Michael, Trade and Romance, Chicago & London, University of Chicago Press, 2014.

Peleggi, Maurizio, ‘Shifting alterity: The Mongol in the visual and literary culture of the late Middle Ages’, The Medieval History Journal, vol. 4, iss. 1, 2001, pp. 16-33.

Piacentini, Valeria Fiorani, ‘The Golden Age of Genoa’s eastwards trade (13th-15th centuries)’, The Journal of Central Asian Studies, vol. 19, iss. 1, 2010, pp. 25-40.

Prazniak, Roxann, ‘Siena on the Silk Roads: Ambrogio Lorenzetti and the Mongol Global Century, 1250-1350’, Journal of World History, vol. 21, iss. 2, 2010, pp. 177-217.

Prazniak, Roxann, ‘Tabriz on the Silk Roads: Thirteenth-century Eurasian cultural connections’, Asian Review of World Histories, vol. 1, iss. 2, 2013, pp. 169-188.

Wallace, David, Premodern Places: Calais to Surinam, Chaucer to Aphra Behn, Malden MA, Blackwell, 2004.

1 Mongol attitudes to trade are well explained in Virgil Ciocîltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, trans. Samuel Willcocks, Leiden, 2012, pp. 1-36; see also Timothy May, The Mongol Conquests in World History, London, 2012, pp. 109-29.
2 Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350, Oxford, 1989; Roxann Prazniak, ‘Siena on the Silk Roads: Ambrogio Lorenzetti and the Mongol Global Century, 1250-1350’, Journal of World History, vol. 21, iss. 2, 2010, pp. 177-217.
3 See Ciocîltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade, which throughout gives the impression of confident, at times assertive engagement; also Valeria Fiorani Piacentini, ‘The Golden Age of Genoa’s eastwards trade (13th-15th centuries)’, The Journal of Central Asian Studies, vol. 19, iss. 1, 2010, pp. 25-40.
4 Colleen Ho, ‘Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century European-Mongol Relations’, History Compass, vol. 10, iss. 12, 2012, pp. 949-50.
5 Ciocîltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade, p. 281.
6 Nicola Di Cosmo, ‘Black Sea emporia and the Mongol Empire: A reassessment of the Pax Mongolica’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 53, iss. 1-2, 2009, p. 103.
7 I take the Egyptian state’s name for itself from Dmitri Korobeinikov, ‘A Broken Mirror: The Kipchak World in the Thirteenth Century’, in The Other Europe in the Middle Ages: Avars, Bulgars, Khazars, and Cumans, ed. Florin Curta, Leiden, 2008, p. 379; for slave traders’ record-keeping, see Sally McKee, ‘Domestic slavery in Renaissance Italy’, Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies, vol. 29, iss. 3, 2008, pp. 314-5.
8 Ciocîltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade, pp. 165, 201.
9 Ibid., p. 201.
10 Ibid., 206-7.
11 Di Cosmo, ‘Black Sea emporia’, pp. 104-5.
12 May, The Mongol Conquests in World History, p. 209.
13 Di Cosmo, ‘Black Sea emporia’, p. 105; again, ‘Mongols and Merchants on the Black Sea Frontier in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: Convergences and Conflicts’, in Mongols, Turks and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World, eds. Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran, Leiden, 2005, pp. 394-5.
14 David Braud, ‘The Slave Supply in Classical Greece’, in The Cambridge World History of Slavery, Volume 1: The Ancient Mediterranean World, eds. Keith Bradley and Paul Cartledge, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 112-33.
15 Benjamin Z. Kedar, Merchants in Crisis: Genoese and Venetian Men of Affairs and the Fourteenth-Century Depression, New Haven and London, 1976, pp. 9-11.
16 Ciocîltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade, p. 213.
17 Di Cosmo, ‘Black Sea emporia, p. 25; for nasij, see Thomas T. Allsen, Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire: A Cultural History of Islamic Textiles, Cambridge, 1997.
18 Kedar, Merchants in Crisis, pp. 85-97.
19 Steven A. Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528, Chapel Hill and London, 1996, ch. 5, last paragraph (unpaginated ebook).
20 Kedar, Merchants in Crisis, pp. 2-3.
21 Donald F. Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, Volume 1: The Century of Discovery, Book One, Chicago and London, 1965, pp. 71-3; Ho, ‘Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century European-Mongol Relations’, pp. 951-3; Maurizio Peleggi, ‘Shifting alterity: The Mongol in the visual and literary culture of the late Middle Ages’, The Medieval History Journal, vol. 4, iss. 1, 2001, p. 27-33.
22 Prazniak, ‘Siena on the Silk Roads’; for Tabriz as a ‘world historical city’, Roxann Prazniak,‘Tabriz on the Silk Roads: Thirteenth-century Eurasian cultural connections’, Asian Review of World Histories, vol. 1, iss. 2, 2013, pp. 169-188.
23 Sheila Blair, ‘The Religious Art of the Ilkhanids’, in The Legacy of Genghis Khan: Courtly Art and Culture in Western Asia, 1256-1353, eds. Linda Komaroff and Stefano Carboni, New Haven and London, 2002, p. 112.
24 Michael Murrin, Trade and Romance, Chicago & London, 2014, pp. 9-26.
25 Carmel Jordan, ‘Soviet Archeology and the Setting of the Squire’s Tale’, The Chaucer Review, vol. 22, iss. 2, 1987, pp. 128-9.
26 Murrin, Trade and Romance, pp. 43-62; for Chaucer’s Italian contacts, see also Wendy Childs, ‘Anglo-Italian Contacts in the Fourteenth Century’, in Chaucer and the Italian Trecento, ed. Piero Boitani, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 65-87.
27 Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo: The Complete Yule-Cordier Edition, eds. Henry Yule and Henri Cordier, 2 vols, New York, 1993, i, pp. 238, 245.
28 Steven A. Epstein, Purity Lost: Transgressing Boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1000-1400, Baltimore, 2006, p. 122.
29 Jo Ann Cavallo, The World Beyond Europe in the Romance Epics of Boiardo and Ariosto, Toronto, 2013, pp. 45-61.
30 The Alliterative Morte Arthure: A Critical Edition, ed. Valerie Krishna, New York, 1976, lines 840-85.
31 David Wallace, Premodern Places: Calais to Surinam, Chaucer to Aphra Behn, Malden MA, 2004, pp. 181-202.
32 Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, p. 131, endnote 1.
33 For usual disposal of the dead, see May, The Mongol Conquests in World History, p. 202.
34 De’ Mussis, quoted in Rosemary Horrox, The Black Death, Manchester, 1994, p. 19.
35 Ibid., primary sources on the spread of the plague in continental Europe, pp. 14-61.

36 Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, ch. 5, section ‘How the plague changed society and the economy’.

Images from

Dostoyevsky and me

I haven’t, as yet, bitten off the writing of a post on my oldest and strongest influence, Fyodor Dostoyevsky.

Influence? Even now, in my novella Waste Flowers, his novels are all over it. Why not? Waste Flowers, too, deals with revolution, violence, and experiences of evil. The next novella: even more so, and still steeped in Dostoyevsky. When Oliver pinned me to the wall to articulate a thematic statement or thematic conflict to go with my outline, I flailed around and mouthed ‘kind of Dostoyevsky?’; and for an explanation first sent him to an article by novelist Laurie Sheck on Dostoyevsky’s ‘Radical Empathy’. My final thematic statement, which I am reluctant to air in public, pulled in the old Terence quote that has had my heart since my favourite teacher conveyed his love for it: Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.

Oh what do I have to lose? here’s the thematic conflict (ongoing — he wanted one I can continue to hash out in future novellas), as submitted to Oliver:

A thematic conflict that puts two things I passionately believe in at loggerheads (in other words, I can milk this forever):
It’s worthwhile to make unlikely friends, to reach out to dangerous people. ‘I am human, and think nothing human alien to me’ ― Terence
Counter: Punch Nazis.

I do have a few reviews of his novels up, that talk about my encounter with them:  Karamazov, Crime and Punishment, The Idiot, others.

I’m going to post an essay I wrote for a history unit, about the trio of Tolstoy, Turgenev and Dostoyevsky, and their relationship to radical politics. It’s a bit of a screed, I admit. That’s because I was set off by a particular piece, and aim at one person’s bad take.

Still, several years later that same scholar turned up in the literary newspapers, with his same bad take, and a social media mutual of mine — with whom I shared interests in Mongol history as well as Russian history — named one of these his article of the year (circa 2016), that shed light on the politics of today. My mutual was of a more conservative bent than me, but of course I too apply the novels to today. It’s not distant literary history, it’s close to the bone.

This is a shaggy beast of an essay. But if the bad take person can get into the NYRB etc, and be a public intellectual on these matters, I won’t be shy to post my take.

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Against schemes: the great writers versus the radicals in nineteenth-century Russia

There has been a tendency in the historiography to line up the great novelists of the Russian nineteenth century and range them against the revolutionaries. The latter are seen as dogmatists, dangerous in their commitment to ideas; in contrast, the practitioners of fiction, particularly the great three, Turgenev, Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, are seen as humanists, ideology-free. A recent survey of Russian intellectual history puts this view strongly, and is useful to take as a set of typical arguments in support of this understanding. Such an opposition is too simple and too schematic, for the novelists differ greatly from one another and do not agree in their stance towards radical ideas. The radical camp itself had more room in it for difference than this oppositional scheme often acknowledges. Battle-lines were not as straightforward as writers against radicals. Two directly political novels, Turgenev’s Fathers and Children and Dostoyevsky’s Demons, exhibit the discrepancy between their authors. These novels cannot be taken at face value as history, of course, or as objective observation; they were engagement in the politics of the day by authors who were not positionless. The three great novelists had divergent views which tend to be erased by historiography that treats them as if they were above politics, even as they comment on it; or as if they were anti-political in response to the more urgent of the intelligentsia who pressed for change.

In a major recent survey of Russian intellectual history, the topic of nineteenth century novelists and their entanglement with politics is covered by Gary Saul Morson with a contribution titled ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition: The Radical Intelligentsia and Classical Russian Literature’.[1] Here the ‘tradition’ is that of the intelligenty, a word Morson uses in its narrowest possible sense to mean a radical thinker, one with an ideology of revolution; this tradition begins in the 1860s and continues unbroken up to the Bolsheviks and the achievement of revolution in 1917.[2] The ‘counter-tradition’ is that of the ‘great writers’ of fiction: Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Turgenev, Chekhov. Lesser writers who espoused radical ideas in their work such as Chernyshevsky belong to the tradition, not the counter-tradition; Morson calls this committed literature ‘propaganda’.[3] By his scheme, these are two camps in conflict. The great writers saw the ‘danger’ of radical thought and made their intellectual attacks in the field of fiction; they also offered a ‘set of alternatives’ to counter the proposals of radicals.[4] This set of alternatives is presented in the singular; that is, Morson does not draw distinctions between the four main writers whom he enlists; he concentrates on commonalities that pit them as one against the radical camp. Again, among the radicals, he does not mention distinct strands of thought or changes in prevalent ideology in the course of these sixty years; the intelligenty are grouped and seen to agree, whichever decade they are from. He tries to extract what is essential from tradition and counter-tradition, ‘characters’ for them that need not be strongly historicised.

The problem with Morson’s schematic treatment is this lack of distinctions. On both sides, significant differences in philosophy are elided to produce a war of ideas where the writers are set against the radicals. Even for a survey that has to give the situation in brief, serious distortions enter in as each side is made to fit the scheme. The three novelists whose careers overlap, Turgenev (1818-83), Dostoyevsky (1821-81) and Tolstoy (1828-1910), cannot be aligned together in this way, as if their fundamental lessons were the same; while Morson’s portrait of the intelligenty ignores the contrast between Nihilism and Populism, two schools with which Turgenev and Dostoyevsky engaged. Morson’s oppositional scheme is not new: Aileen Kelly, an acute critic of Western historiography on Russia, observes that a pattern of ‘writers versus radicals’ is an old one; historians who slip into this pattern do so to take the side of the writers and with them to expose the radicals.[5] Kelly writes as if this dichotomy is outdated, but a decade after her book Morson perpetuates the model of hostile camps; and he is certainly on the side of the writers, whose truths indisputably win out over the intelligenty. In fact, Morson presents the intelligenty case unfairly. The novelists themselves made much more complex judgments on their radical contemporaries.

There is a similarity between what Kelly criticises in historians as ‘psychohistory’ and a method Morson describes for the novelists, that of biographical explanation.[6] ‘Psychohistory’, once often practiced when liberal historians (so termed by Kelly) wrote of revolutionaries, means the ascription of psychological motivation to political activists; at its worst this amounted to ‘pathologising’ radical tendencies as a mental or emotional deficiency, even an illness.[7] Clearly, these were historians antipathetic to radical causes, who refused to grant that a healthy mind might espouse them. In the Russian novelists, Morson points out a biographical tactic: to explain a radical person in terms of ‘psychic need’, so that an ‘irony of origins’ exposes, again, the personal deficiency or frustration that underlies the political commitment.[8] More caution is needed on this subject. In a statement about revolutionaries of his acquaintance, Turgenev explicitly clears them from this sort of motive:

All the real negators I have known, without exception (Belinsky, Bakunin, Herzen, Dobrolyubov, Speshnev, etc.), came from comparatively good and honest parents. A great idea is contained therein: it removes from the men of action, the negators, every suspicion of personal dissatisfaction, personal irritation. They go their way only because they are more sensitive to the demands of national life.[9]

Psychohistory, which Turgenev stands against in this quote, is now rarely practiced by historians of Russia, Kelly reports.[10] But novelists must come under scrutiny for their similar strategy. Since novelists are permitted the right to use personal arguments and psychological speculation, their truth value has to be questioned just as when a historian enters into conjectural mentalities. Psychohistorians gave away as much about themselves as about their subjects; so too may novelists. Morson fails to interrogate the great writers, whom he assumes to be objective, rather like an ideal historian. They are never presented as wrong through his chapter, and he never allows that the radicals might have a legitimate grievance against them, although of course their portrayals of radicals were highly contested at the time.[11]

Turgenev is better known for his dissection of ‘superfluous persons’ and their psychological ills than he is for psychoanalysis of radicals.[12]  He was one of the main practitioners of the ‘superfluous’ type: liberal-minded people who in the circumstances of Russia found no outlet for their energies, no work to satisfy their social conscience. With these he self-identifies; Kelly says that ‘Turgenev, who immortalised this type in his novels, was himself one of its most striking representatives’.[13] His first superfluous person, Rudin in the novel of that name (1857), was presumed to be a portrait of the anarchist Bakunin, but Alexander Herzen, a friend of both, said the portrait was much more of the author himself. Rudin has extravagant failings, but then Turgenev once remarked that critics are unaware of how much an author can enjoy exhibiting his own faults in an invented character.[14] Arguably, Turgenev was not nearly as given to subjecting his ‘men of action’ to a critical psychological scrutiny. Insarov in On the Eve (1860) is a man of action, a Bulgarian committed to the struggle for his country’s liberty; other characters in the novel mock his dedication to his cause, but he gets the girl, Yelena, who is thirsty for an active life (Richard Freeborn says that the character of Yelena captures young Russians’ hunger for ‘revolutionary change’ more closely than had been seen in fiction at that stage). Turgenev’s most famous fictional ‘negator’ is Bazarov in Fathers and Children (1862), a novel that put the term Nihilist into circulation in Russia. As per Turgenev’s quote on revolutionaries he has known in real life, Bazarov is given a biography that begins with a very loving family home; he has no grudges against his background or his poverty. He is introduced into the novel as a picture of rude mental health, without discernible ‘psychic needs’ to be fulfilled through activism. Nihilism in the 1860s was succeeded by Populism in the 70s; with Virgin Soil (1877) Turgenev wrote about the Populists as misguided idealists; he says in a letter, ‘they must feel my sympathy… if not for their goals, at least for their personalities’.[15] It cannot be said that Turgenev’s men and women ‘of action’ are portrayed as sick or needy; his speciality is more the malaise of the idle ‘superfluous person’.

Morson outlines a ‘masterplot’ held in common by the Russian novel of ideas, or the ‘anti-ideological’ novel, in a description he thinks more apt. This is plot deployed as a weapon against the radicals. Plot uncovers an ‘irony of origins’ in the subject’s psychology, then in an ‘irony of unwelcome outcomes’, brings his radical ideas to a bad end.[16] However, in Turgenev’s case, the author seems more likely to bring his action heroes to a bad end that in no way dismisses their ideas. Both Insarov and Bazarov are struck down by disease before they achieve a greatness that is foreseen of them by other characters. If plot is a weapon in the novelist’s hands, certainly the story seems to attack Bazarov. Not on the level of ideas; Morson notes the anti-ideological novel did not proceed by ‘logical critique’. Instead of attack the argument, it aimed at the man. The strangest thing that happens to Bazarov is that he is reduced to the status of a superfluous person. Odintsova tells him he is superseded, not the ‘new people’ any more; his rude health, inner and outer, is lost in the course of the novel; in a prelude to his fatal illness, he succumbs to aimlessness, the inability to work; his failed love affair seems to set him on the same course as that of Pavel Petrovich, his ‘superfluous’ adversary whose excuse for a blighted life was a failure in love in his youth. This attack by the story seems more to serve the author’s ‘psychic need’. Turgenev was inclined to the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer; Herzen warned him that pessimism, which sees a necessarily bleak end, was in danger of dragging him to the illiberal. If effort is futile, change by human intervention is impossible; and that did not suit the liberal gradualist Turgenev thought he was.[17] About Bazarov, Turgenev was not only conflicted in his feelings but confessed to a lack of self-awareness (‘I don’t know whether I love him or hate him’, one of his several letters on the matter has).[18] The controversy Fathers and Children met with went beyond the author’s expectations, and he was disturbed to find responses almost opposite to his intentions, or to the positions he understood he took; in a published apologia for the novel he writes, ‘I noted the coldness, practically indignation, of many people close and sympathetic to me; I was congratulated, almost embraced by people belonging to a camp repugnant to me, by enemies’.[19] Here is an ‘irony of outcome’ that turns back on the author. He did not take issue with Bazarov’s ideas, but he let the story attack him, to defuse him before he killed him off. Isaiah Berlin, in his influential classic Russian Thinkers, expatiates on Turgenev as the model and the first great portraitist in fiction of the universal liberal in a troubled world, valiantly balanced between fanaticisms of the left and right.[20] His description of Turgenev’s stance becomes a hymn to the liberal in other times and places, with an undisguised identification by the writer. As a ‘prototype liberal’ Turgenev has remained a favourite of ‘liberal Western’ historians and literary critics, to use again the typology of Kelly. Such ownership of Turgenev, however, neglects his pessimism, which led him to preach a futility of effort at the end of most of his novels. In particular, he cannot let a ‘man of action’ live.

‘Positive heroes’ is a phrase used about fiction from the radical camp, but it is not irrelevant to the great writers, even where they are anti-radical. For the intelligenty, says Morson, literature ought to be propaganda. They had a utilitarian view of art, and practised an ‘internal censorship’ whereby revolutionary protagonists were required to be portrayed in a positive light.[21] This was the ‘positive hero’, who was meant to inspire with his or her commitment and who was given altruistic not ulterior motives. There are several observations to be made. The prime example of a ‘positive hero’ novel was Chernyshevsky’s What Is To Be Done?; and this was written in response to Turgenev’s Fathers and Children – as a rebuttal and a correction.[22] In certain areas Chernyshevsky has a clear case against Turgenev and reason to rebut him. Turgenev gives a lampoon of an emancipated woman in Kukshina; furthermore he makes his Nihilist Bazarov contemptuous of women in general, with no comradeship displayed towards his fellow freethinker Kukshina. The only novels in which emancipated women were not satirised issued from the radical camp; Chernyshevsky’s novel centres on one, for women’s emancipation was a radical cause.[23] This fact earns the radical novel no points whatsoever with Morson, although it is hard to see why a ‘positive hero’ like Chernyshevsky’s Vera is more propagandist than a lampoon like Turgenev’s Kukshina, whom Morson calls ‘repulsive’.[24] The historian himself descends into caricature of radicals and their ‘rigid code’, a straitjacket of style; ‘one simply had to have dirty fingernails, dress badly, flaunt one’s inability to understand art and, in the case of women, call attention to one’s promiscuity’. In this characterisation of intelligenty (right the way from the 60s to the Bolsheviks), noblemen who joined them learned bad manners, these being de rigueur. But here the historian has decided what good and bad manners are; there is no suggestion that noblemen’s manners might be legitimately faulted, although Dostoyevsky, whenever he met Turgenev, complained in letters of his ‘aristocratic mannerisms’ which he found arrogant and offensive; he includes these mannerisms in his satirical portrait of Turgenev in Demons.[25] Chernyshevsky had reason to accuse Turgenev of a low blow when he made his radical figure disparage women, since most radicals were champions of emancipation. Bazarov is ungentlemanly towards them; at one point Odintsova is afraid of a violent sexual assault by him, whose passion in this scene is described with animal imagery.[26] By way of contrast, Dostoyevsky peoples his novels with sexual exploiters who belong to the gentlemanly class. These choices, to make either radicals or nobles notable for disrespect towards women and sexual coercion, came of different standpoints and had political implications. Novelists chose to assign positivity or negativity, in accord with their convictions; it is not sufficient to say that Chernyshevsky, but not Turgenev or Dostoyevsky, practised ‘propaganda’.

Chernyshevsky wrote contra Turgenev, and felt driven to simplify his own side into a caricature; the ‘positive hero’ is a defensive position, existing because of an unfair hearing elsewhere. The front he put on can then be satirised in turn by historians as the real revolutionary (who subscribed to a catechism ‘without hesitation, doubt or scepticism’[27]), if they do not consider the circumstances and if they do not look behind the pages. Behind the published pages now and then exist diaries which tell a different tale. Aileen Kelly has investigated private writings by committed revolutionaries that give expression to a self-doubt not allowed in print, due to the ‘internal censor’, guardian of the image of revolutionaries.[28] In the troubled atmosphere post-1905, she finds, these private voices tried erupt into print; there was a brief spate of publishing of fiction about (and by) ‘doubt-ridden revolutionaries’, in rebellion against that necessary positivity.[29] The past ‘internal censor’ for radical writings in Russia meant that they did not have a model to offset What Is To Be Done?, the highly influential model for writing the positive hero. But they might have done had Dostoyevsky lived to write a novel he told a friend about in his last year, a sequel to The Brothers Karamazov where Alyosha would abandon the religious life and convert to revolution: ‘He would commit a political crime. He would be executed. He would have searched for truth, and in these searches, naturally, he would have become a revolutionary’.[30] In the course of this conversation, Dostoyevsky and his friend discussed recent assassination attempts upon the tsar; they admitted neither one of them, nor anybody they knew, would turn in a terrorist to the police if they had the chance, even to stop a bomb in the Winter Palace; and Dostoyevsky said he would like to write about ‘the strange relation of society to these crimes’, except ‘one can’t do so. In our society one is not allowed to speak about the most important things’.[31] Extraordinarily, Dostoyevsky urged upon the tsar himself a sympathetic understanding of these would-be assassins; their ‘young Russian energies’ had been led astray, but Dostoyevsky stressed they were ‘sincere’ and did not condemn their motives.[32] Alyosha is a saintly boy in The Brothers Karamazov, a nearly ideal character for Dostoyevsky; with him the author is as far as can be from the harsh satire of Demons. With him as the convert to revolution, a tragic story must be expected, with a focus on difficult moral choices as in The Brothers Karamazov, and written with the inner complexity of a Raskolnikov instead of from the outside as are the revolutionaries in Demons. He would be neither a positive nor a negative hero, since it is inconceivable for Dostoyevsky to continue his beloved character of Alyosha in either vein. Revolutionaries in fiction had not enjoyed the full humanising treatment of a major novelist. Bazarov does not make impossible a stereotype of revolutionaries; he is blusteringly positive and then he is undercut in every way by the story; Bazarov is not written from the inside, either, and his internal workings remain obscure. Dostoyevsky was positioned to write of the revolutionary as he or she had not been seen, and simplifications would have been more difficult thereafter. Not only literary history would be different, but historians’ stereotypes such as Morson’s would have been better evidenced against.

Dostoyevsky made a start in Demons, but this book was written at the height of his disaffection from the left. Morson writes a character for intelligenty that has no room for self-doubt, reflecting the ‘positive hero’ projected by them – the ideal, not the real. He is content to use as evidence of the views of revolutionaries the fictional Shigaylov from Demons with his conclusion, ‘from unlimited freedom I end up at unlimited despotism’.[33] However, Morson does not mention Shigaylov’s own dismay to find his logic leads to this conclusion; nor does Morson’s sketch of the typical intelligenty admit of emotions such as nearly every member of the secret circle in Dostoyevsky’s novel displays when they are led to murder. Shigaylov walks away before the act; another tries to stop it; a third has a strange physiological response of an unending shriek. Verkhovensky, the organiser, says of himself ‘I’m a scoundrel, not a socialist’; which leaves only one member so given over to ideology that he does not feel for the victim, and lives easily afterwards with the act.[34] In her discussion of the post-1905 rebellion against the ‘positive hero’, Kelly tells of an attempt by Maksim Gorky in 1913 to remove from the Moscow Art Theatre’s repertoire a stage play of Demons.[35] Different feelings about the ‘internal censor’ came to a head in the controversy that followed; Gorky, for the censorship camp, lost the argument to a spirit of self-criticism. In spite of its strong satire, Demons was not rejected. Had Dostoyevsky, who still commanded this much respect on the radical left, been allowed by the tsar’s censors to write an updated work on revolutionaries as proposed, the voice of the ‘doubt-ridden revolutionary’ would have been strengthened, the case for its suppression more difficult to argue. Those few fiction writers who did express ethical perplexities such as are found in the diaries would have had encouragement and justification to publish. With overt evidence, historians’ portraits of revolutionaries as people with concreted values and a lack of self-question would not have taken hold. The unwritten book has consequences.

Morson says the novelists are anti-ideological in that they advocate an approach to ethical questions that proceeds ‘case by case’ and eschews a search for ‘common principles’; the lesson being, ‘life is too complex for any ethical theory’.[36] His examples are drawn from Tolstoy. A main one is Anna Karenina’s Levin on Russian engagement in the current war in the Balkans, a war Levin does not support. He is asked a hypothetical question: what about the atrocities going on? Would he take up arms and kill if a Turk were to commit an atrocity upon a Bulgarian in front of him? Levin refuses to speculate; he would decide on the instant. Implicit in this conversation is Tolstoy’s ‘ideas about the relation of distance to ethical action’; in Morson’s words,

Kant notwithstanding, we do not owe the same moral debt and concern to people we have never met on the other side of the world as to our immediate family. Tolstoy here revives the Stoic idea that morality works by something resembling concentric circles. The further we get from our family, our neighbours and our community, the less moral obligation we actually have. Indeed, it is a moral error to assume that the same principles apply in near and distant cases.[37]

It becomes hard to distinguish here whether Morson is making such assertions in his own person or explaining Tolstoy; either way, his agreement with Tolstoy is palpable. The problem lies again in his scheme, whereby he assimilates Dostoyevsky to Tolstoy. Indisputably, this is Tolstoy’s lesson, but it goes against much in Dostoyevsky’s thought. In fact, Dostoyevsky picked out this very passage in Anna Karenina for an entry in his Writer’s Diary.[38] Morson comments that Levin’s ‘answer might seem intellectually unsatisfying’; but for Dostoyevsky, intellect has little to do with it; emotionally and ethically, he is appalled that Levin does not know whether he would save a Bulgarian baby. It is not merely that Dostoyevsky is upset because he supports this war. He finds the point about distance both psychologically and philosophically unsatisfying; for the first, he relates an anecdote about a person greatly affected by the stories of atrocities, as if they happened before his eyes; for the second he asks, ‘If distance really does have such an influence on humaneness, then a new question arises of itself: at what distance does love of humanity end?’ For Dostoyevsky, to circumscribe that love and emotional engagement is monstrous; he cannot understand how Levin, portrayed as a ‘sensitive’ person, can maintain he feels nothing for distant strangers. This question is as crucial for Dostoyevsky’s view of life as it is for Tolstoy’s, but they certainly do not see eye to eye. The great writers do not offer a ‘set of alternatives’ in unanimity against the radicals, as Morson has them.

Tolstoy’s conclusions about the family circle run counter to the religious understanding of Zosima in The Brothers Karamazov. Zosima teaches that everybody is responsible for everybody else; we even have to answer for each other’s crimes.[39] This is one of the lessons of Russian Christianity that Dostoyevsky took very much to heart.[40] Zosima’s sermon in his novel expresses most of what Dostoyevsky valued in Orthodoxy, and it is a sensibility alien to Levin’s, who spoke for Tolstoy. This takes Dostoyevsky out of Morson’s scheme whereby the great writers teach us to value what lies near at hand, the ordinary and everyday, as a cure for revolutionaries’ large-scale dreams.[41] At the end of his Writer’s Diary entry Dostoyevsky impersonates Levin’s domestic complacency: as he reads the newspapers with reports of atrocities he thinks, ‘Kitty is in fine spirits and had a good appetite today… What do I care about what goes on over there in another hemisphere?’ Dostoyevsky finishes in his own voice:  ‘Is this how Levin ends his epic?… So what is it, then, that they are teaching us?’[42] By ‘they’ he means ‘novelists today’, standing outside that category himself. Certainly, Tolstoy is not teaching what Dostoyevsky is teaching. Morson only mentions their artistic appreciation of each other, never ideological difference. The ending of War and Peace is conservative in its marriages and settling-down on estates, and in its final conversation of the characters where the women agree with everything their new husbands say, against opinions that they held before. Turgenev’s Yelena would find these family circles suffocating, let alone Chernyshevsky’s Vera. Morson suggests Anna Karenina’s Dolly is the real hero of that book, even above Levin; but her domesticity, of course, is a poor offer for women who wished to be active in the world like Yelena or fully emancipated like Vera. When Turgenev ends a novel in domesticity he is more ambivalent; whether the ‘jackdaws’ (homebody birds, used as a jeer by Bazarov) who marry at the end of Fathers and Children have sunk into complacency or found the rightful sphere for human activity is left much more open to question than in Tolstoy’s two novels. For Dostoyevsky, both Turgenev and Tolstoy were ‘landowner-gentry writers’[43] and he noticed the effects of this in their plots, not only in their circumstances which made the quiet life and incremental improvement in management of an estate an option for them and a natural end for a novel. War and Peace, for Dostoyevsky, was a beautiful evocation of a world that had always been illusory, because based on slavery (serfdom).[44] Anna Karenina frustrated him with its class interests, that ignored current pressing concerns in wider society; he is not convinced by Levin’s pretensions to be ‘one of the people’.[45] Dostoyevsky does not do the domestic ending, and certainly not on a landowner’s estate.[46] He asks in his Writer’s Diary why Tolstoy does not instead address the ‘accidental families’, dysfunctional families that Dostoyevsky sees on the rise in Russia, with ad hoc parents; as Anna Karenina comes out, he is plotting his last novels on an ‘accidental family’ and on the terrible family of The Brothers Karamazov.[47] The family question is not apolitical; ending in domesticity can advocate quiescence, settling for things as they are; to refuse to end a novel this way bespeaks an urge for change. To brush out the difference between Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy is to ignore that Tolstoy retained aristocratic values while Dostoyevsky probably thought like a radical. Neither of them is classless or non-political or in Kelly’s word, liberal, which is the default position of Morson, who is too keen to bring the novelists to it. Tolstoy’s essential conservatism, in his two major novels, should not go unnoticed, nor should Dostoyevsky’s ongoing passion for social justice and for change.

Demons was outdated even as its last instalments were published in 1871-2; a ‘sea-change’ on the Russian radical left saw a great shift away from almost everything Dostoyevsky was most hostile to.[48] The Populists of the 70s had much in common with the Utopian Socialists of Dostoyevsky’s youth, when he himself had joined a secret revolutionary circle.[49] Like the Utopians, the Populists were Christ-inspired in their ethics, even when they remained atheists (his persistent point of difference with them).[50] They rejected the materialist, scientific-determinist basis of the Nihilists before them, seen at its harshest in Bazarov and those one or two radicals who defended Bazarov and identified their cause with him.[51] By this shift Fathers and Children with its 60s style of radical was outdated too. Morson puts ‘intelligentsia “science”’ in inverted commas, to say that ideology came above science, as it came above everything; though they thought themselves science-based, the natural sciences existed for them in order to prove social and political doctrines already held.[52] This does not do justice to what the intelligenty thought their project was. Science-based radicals had begun with the axiom that ‘only natural science was free of ideological contamination’ and therefore was ‘the only reliable source for social values’.[53] The Bazarovs believed this axiom, which makes them rather anti-ideological, in their own eyes, than ideologues. Social orders were bad because ‘human life is constructed… upon the basis of abstract ideas’;[54] that is, the Bazarovs rejected abstractions, which is the contrary of what Morson says of radicals as a whole. For him, they were addicted to ‘theoretism’, defined as the state when theory becomes a universal prescription, a perfect application, with particulars, the contingent, the circumstantial forgotten. Trust in science instead of human-made social orders, such as exhibited by Bazarov, did not last. In 1879 one hold-out for the old ‘positive knowledge’ ceded reluctantly and wrote, ‘let us agree that we were mistaken to think that the frog would save the world’ – a reference to Bazarov’s dissection of frogs.[55] Daniel Todes in his history of evolutionary science in Russia reports that Bazarov’s ‘plain scientism was soon overturned’,[56] although the novel, in immortalising this type, may contribute to an impression of more longevity. A ‘populist critique of scientism’ ensued in the 70s.[57] Bazarov was not a socialist; he explicitly refuses to be content to work for those less well off or for people in the future; he is concerned with good for himself and does not have cooperative values.[58] However, the Russian natural sciences found cooperation within and even between species more prevalent than that ‘struggle for survival’ which evolutionary science in Europe concentrated on. There was a general rejection in Russia of the ‘struggle’ trope and its justification of selfishness, in favour of cooperation as an evolutionary driver, and therefore the right way for human society.[59] It is against the background of this distinctly Russian science that the Populist ‘movement to the people’ emerged, which believed in a proto-socialism among the peasants.

Populism was anti-intellectual. Morson does not seem to include this brand of radical in his intelligenty group, for he gives intelligenty the criteria that ‘they never doubted the leading role of the intelligentsia itself’; they presumed their own ‘entitlement to rule’.[60] But the Populists, from the educated classes, turned against the idea that the intelligentsia knew better than the people. Their ‘going to the people’ movement had as its aim to ‘understand their lives, so that the society of the future would be based on their needs and aspirations and not on the theories of an intellectual elite.’[61] In part because radical Russia had been overwhelmingly horrified by Nechaev with his dictatorship by secret circle and his murder of a member of it, post-Nechaev Populism was against authoritarian socialism or deception of the people.[62] Populist thinkers taught that ‘whenever ‘consciousness’ had been imposed on the masses, a new breed of exploiters had come to power’.[63] Change must be ‘not from above but from below.’[64] The nightmares of Demons, the novel inspired by Nechaev, were in recession: ‘to make the revolution for the people would be to go against the antiauthoritarian ethos of populism and to perpetuate the rule of coercive elites’.[65] Their anti-intellectualism struck a chord with Dostoyevsky, who had come to just the same conclusions in his forced encounter with the people in prison in Siberia. Never again, after prison, did Dostoyevsky think intellectual prescriptions were of help in Russia; the way forward lay in the people, and in what they believed.[66] Populism reconciled Dostoyevsky to the left.[67]

Distinctions between ideas and ideology, belief and commitment, can be hard to make; but it is fair to say Dostoyevsky was no enemy to ideas or to belief. He was less ‘anti-ideological’ than Turgenev, who had a ‘mistrust of systems’ but also a temperamental propensity to preach futility of effort.[68] Dostoyevsky can be seen as an optimist in contradistinction to Turgenev’s pessimist; he liked to end novels on an inspirational note whenever he found this feasible (Crime and Punishment, The Brothers Karamazov, as against the prose-poem on futility that winds up Turgenev’s Smoke). He has a strong conviction that few persons are beyond salvation in a moral sense, and he often depicts a total change of life, from Raskolnikov to Zosima – in other words, conversion. Religious conversions such as Zosima’s are not greatly differentiated from ideological conversions (Raskolnikov) or moral-spiritual ones with neither overt religion or ideology (Dmitri and Grushenka in The Brothers Karamazov). Even his quiescent characters – Prince Myshkin in The Idiot, Alyosha, both with a Christ-like meekness – are agents of transformation in other people. To be passive but transformative is a very different thing than to live the quiet life and be self-involved, which is Dostoyevsky’s verdict on Levin. They live for other people – whoever calls on them, known or unknown, family or stranger. Theirs is not an ethic of ‘do good near at hand’, and ‘to make the world anew’ is a notion that attracts them, not repels them. These three authors’ ideal characters are not in the least the same types. Morson claims the novelists mistrust ‘suddenness’ and teach gradualism; a love for ‘suddenness’ seems to be a psychological trait, and in the political sphere leans one to revolution. However, Dostoyevsky was never immune to the possibilities of suddenness, while he became convinced revolution was entirely a European concept, irrelevant to Russian circumstances.[69] Although he invested his hope in reforms from the tsar-liberator, he was subject himself to wild ‘eschatological’ visions for the world, the collapse of Europe and a renewal that would spring from Russia.[70] Morson cites the author’s use of his own experience of epilepsy in The Idiot, and equates the sense of spiritual harmony before fits which he describes for Prince Myshkin with other false dreams of sudden or violent solutions. But Dostoyevsky always clung to the hope that his experiences of a universal harmony in the moments before fits were not simply due to illness but had a true element of insight into those scriptures he has Prince Myshkin quote: ‘There shall be no more time’.[71] For Morson to say that these raptures ‘led inevitably to insanity’ the way revolution led to a social psychosis is too condemnatory even within the precincts of the novel, to leave aside the author’s own prognosis. Prince Myshkin does end insane, but this does not necessarily devalue his glimpses of harmony, and Dostoyevsky’s own investment in that scriptural text is clear.

One of Dostoyevsky’s main lessons is that people have swinging personalities, open to conversion or moral change; Russians in particular swung from one extreme to the other, as characters say several times in Brothers Karamazov. This is why he can project a sequel where the Christ-imitating Alyosha becomes a revolutionary. Dostoyevsky’s vision of a swinging personality is not hostile to ideas. Key is a scriptural verse he uses in Demons: ‘I know thy works, that thou art neither cold nor hot: I would thou wert cold or hot. So then because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spew thee out of my mouth’.[72] In his Writer’s Diary he says it is a trait of Russians to take ideas over-seriously, to pursue them to ends undreamt of where they began, in Europe.

Can a Russian youth remain indifferent to the influence of these leaders of progressive European thought, and in particular to the Russian aspect of their teachings? Please allow me this funny phrase “the Russian aspect of their teachings” because a Russian aspect of their teachings really does exist. It consists of those conclusions drawn from their teachings that take on the form of an invincible axiom, conclusions that are drawn only in Russia; in Europe, as people say, the possibility of these conclusions is not even suspected.[73]

This Russianness he accepts; he presents it over and over in his novels, and certainly he sees it in himself. Dostoyevsky’s biographical journey from revolutionary to reactionary and part the way back again is not that of a person who looks to the middle ground like Isaiah Berlin’s liberal, based on Turgenev. Neither are his novels. Even Demons, written at a time when he felt most estranged from the left, prefers a believer to an uncommitted person, and finds the potential for salvation in those most mad with ‘atheism, revolutionism’ and the rest of Morson’s list.[74] Kirillov, maddened with atheism, gives a moving tribute to Christ; and if he swung, as the character Shatov tells him, he would have the dedication of a saint, instead of his self-sacrifice by pistol to prove there is no God. Kirillov may be ‘demented’ or similar words that critics call him; nevertheless he is presented with warm sympathy, and his last night on earth, shared with Shatov whose last night it is also, reveals the human values of both, in the novel’s warmest pages. Shatov, the victim of the secret circle which he has tried to exit, has not renounced revolution because he has acquired a sceptical attitude for great ideas, but because he has converted to other ideas, every bit as fervid and similar to Dostoyevsky’s own. Whether or not people are ‘believers’ by temperament is important in the book, and if they are there is hope for them, no matter what their current ideas. It is Stavrogin’s tragedy that he can seed ideas in other people (both Kirillov and Shatov) but never commit to them himself.[75] It is he who is the ‘lukewarm’ in the verse of scripture, empty, who commits crimes trivial or terrible from boredom. The Nechaev-figure Dostoyevsky has turned into ‘a scoundrel, not a socialist’, for no reason discovered by his intellectual biographer Joseph Frank. Not after his own secret circle, whose ethics he defends in the Writer’s Diary: ‘There was not a single “monster” or “scoundrel” among the Petrashevsky Circle’.[76] But Verkhovensky’s utter vacancy of principles, beliefs or other moral content answers to Dostoyevsky’s idea of true villainy, which is an inability to dedicate the self to any cause. To have a heartfelt socialist at the centre of this conspiracy would have aligned more easily with the ‘anti-ideological novel’, but less so with Dostoyevsky’s understanding of evil.

A certain disgust with radical politics lies not far beneath the surface of this chapter by Gary Saul Morson; a one-sidedness typical of those who wish to range the great novelists of the Russian nineteenth century against the revolutionaries. It seems to be too easy for such historians to position the novelists in an ideal liberal centre space that is free from ideology. No such space existed, but is the blind spot of historians who do not recognise that their own work too has a tendency, much as Morson openly despises works with tendency. Dostoyevsky in particular is an ill fit in schemes of writers versus radicals, for he did not change his spots in Siberia so far as to leave behind the traits and the concerns that led him to revolutionary activity in youth. Morson makes him and his lessons more or less equivalent to Tolstoy’s, but Dostoyevsky’s own writings testify against this. Turgenev had a strong pessimism that led him not so much to uphold the status quo as to preach the futility of effort, a propensity that makes him anti-change. These great novelists did not sing from one hymn-book, contra revolution and its works on behalf of liberal humanism. The revolutionaries themselves were a more diverse set than Morson grants: authoritarian or anti-authoritarian, materialist or idealist, inspired by science or by a religious ethic. It is of the utmost importance to distinguish, to admit the plural worlds of both the writers and the radicals. Neither should be put into the singular.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Chernyshevsky, Nikolai What Is To Be Done?, trans. Michael R. Katz, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1989.

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor The Brothers Karamazov, trans. David McDuff, London, Penguin, 2003.

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor Crime and Punishment, trans. David McDuff, London, Penguin, 2003.

Dostoevsky, Fyodor Demons, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, New York, Vintage Classics, 1994.

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor The Idiot, trans. David McDuff, London, Penguin, 2004.

Dostoevsky, Fyodor A Writer’s Diary, trans. Kenneth Lantz, abridged edn, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 2009.

Katz, Michael R. (trans. and ed.) Fathers and Children: A Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, New York, W.W. Norton, 2009.

Turgenev, Ivan Fathers and Sons, trans. Richard Freeborn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991.

Turgenev, Ivan Rudin and On the Eve, trans. David McDuff, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.

Turgenev, Ivan Virgin Soil, trans. Michael Pursglove, Richmond, Alma Classics, 2014.

Secondary works

Berlin, Isaiah Russian Thinkers, 2nd edn, London, Penguin, 2008.

Frank, Joseph Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years, 1865-1871, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995.

Frank, Joseph Dostoevsky: The Mantle of the Prophet, 1871-1881, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.

Freeborn, Richard The Russian Revolutionary Novel: Turgenev to Pasternak, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Hamburg, G.M. ‘Russian Intelligentsias’ in A History of Russian Thought, eds. William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 44-69.

Kelly, Aileen M. Towards Another Shore: Russian Thinkers Between Necessity and Chance, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1998.

Morson, Gary Saul ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition: The Radical Intelligentsia and Classical Russian Literature’ in A History of Russian Thought, eds. William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 141-168.

Offord, Derek Nineteenth-Century Russia: Opposition to Autocracy, Harlow, Longman, 1999.

Peace, Richard ‘Nihilism’ in A History of Russian Thought, eds. William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 116-140.

Todes, Daniel P. Darwin Without Malthus: The Struggle for Existence in Russian Evolutionary Thought, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989.

Venturi, Franco Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia, trans. Francis Haskell, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1960.

Footnotes

[1] Gary Saul Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition: The Radical Intelligentsia and Classical Russian Literature’ in A History of Russian Thought, eds. William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 141-168.

[2] For different definitions of ‘intelligentsia’ in the Russian context, see G.M. Hamburg, ‘Russian Intelligentsias’ in A History of Russian Thought, pp. 44-69.

[3] Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, p. 143.

[4] Ibid., p. 141.

[5] Aileen M. Kelly, Towards Another Shore: Russian Thinkers Between Necessity and Chance, New Haven and London, 1998, p. 20.

[6] Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, p. 149.

[7] Kelly, Towards Another Shore, pp. 119-21. She uses historian Adam Ulum as representative.

[8] Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, p. 149.

[9] Letter to K.K. Sluchevsky, in Michael R. Katz (ed.), Fathers and Children: A Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, New York, 2009, p. 182.

[10] Kelly, Towards Another Shore, p. 26.

[11] For contemporary responses to Fathers and Children, see Katz (ed.), Fathers and Children: A Norton Critical Edition; for responses to Dostoyevsky’s Demons, see Joseph Frank, Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years, 1865-1871, Princeton, 1995, pp. 396-413.

[12] For the ‘superfluous person’ in Russian fiction, see Derek Offord, Nineteenth-Century Russia: Opposition to Autocracy, Harlow, 1999, pp. 19-22; in Turgenev, see Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers, 2nd edn, London, 2008, pp. 299-350.

[13] Kelly, Towards Another Shore, p. 124.

[14] Ivan Turgenev, ‘Apropos of Fathers and Sons’, in Katz (ed.) Fathers and Children: A Norton Critical Edition, p. 169.

[15] Letter to M.M. Stasyulevich, quoted in Berlin, Russian Thinkers, p. 335.

[16] Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, p. 149.

[17] Kelly, Towards Another Shore, pp. 102-6.

[18] Letter to A.A. Fet, in Katz (ed.) Fathers and Children: A Norton Critical Edition, p. 181.

[19] Turgenev, ‘Apropos’, in Katz (ed.) Fathers and Children: A Norton Critical Edition, p. 168.

[20] Berlin, Russian Thinkers, pp. 342-50.

[21] For the ‘positive hero’, see Offord, Opposition to Autocracy, pp. 59-62.

[22] Nikolai Chernyshevsky, What Is To Be Done?, trans. Michael R. Katz, Ithaca and London, 1989; Richard Freeborn, The Russian Revolutionary Novel: Turgenev to Pasternak, Cambridge, 1982, p. 21.

[23] Freeborn, The Russian Revolutionary Novel, pp. 24-7.

[24] Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, p. 145.

[25] Frank, Miraculous Years, pp. 204-22.

[26] Ivan Turgenev, Fathers and Sons, trans. Richard Freeborn, Oxford, 1991, pp. 103-4.

[27] Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, p. 143.

[28] Kelly, Towards Another Shore, pp. 134-54.

[29] Ibid., pp. 144-7.

[30] Joseph Frank, Dostoevsky: The Mantle of the Prophet, 1871-1881, Princeton, 2002, p. 484; conversation recorded by Aleksey Suvorin.

[31] Ibid. p. 483; see also the discussion of this quote in Kelly, Towards Another Shore, p. 75.

[32] Frank, Mantle of the Prophet, p. 481.

[33] Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, p. 145.

[34] This is Erkel; see Fyodor Dostoevsky, Demons, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, New York, 1994, pp. 597-629.

[35] Kelly, Towards Another Shore, pp. 147-154.

[36] Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, pp. 151-2.

[37] Ibid., p. 152.

[38] Fyodor Dostoevsky, A Writer’s Diary, trans. Kenneth Lantz, abridged edn, Evanston, 2009, pp. 436-42.

[39] Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. David McDuff, London, 2003, pp. 372-404.

[40] Frank, Mantle of the Prophet, pp. 621-35.

[41] Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, pp. 158-60.

[42] Dostoevsky, A Writer’s Diary, p. 442.

[43] Frank, Miraculous Years, p. 424; Frank, Mantle of the Prophet, pp. 167-8.

[44] Dostoevsky, A Writer’s Diary, p. 342.

[45] Ibid., pp. 438-40.

[46] There is an exception: his light comic novel The Village of Stephanchikovo (1859).

[47] Frank, Mantle of the Prophet, p. 170.

[48] Frank, Mantle of the Prophet, pp. 65-86; Kelly, Towards Another Shore, pp. 55-79.

[49] Frank, Mantle of the Prophet, p. 76.

[50] Ibid., p. 80.

[51] Katz (ed.) Fathers and Children: A Norton Critical Edition, p. 193.

[52] Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, p. 144.

[53] Daniel P. Todes, Darwin Without Malthus: The Struggle for Existence in Russian Evolutionary Thought, Oxford, 1989, pp. 24-44.

[54] Ibid., p. 29.

[55] N.V. Shelgunov quoted in Todes, Darwin Without Malthus, p. 35.

[56] Todes, Darwin Without Malthus, pp. 31-2.

[57] Ibid., p. 32.

[58] Turgenev, Fathers and Sons, pp. 126-30.

[59] Todes, Darwin Without Malthus; the book as a whole is a study of this.

[60] Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, pp. 145-6.

[61] Kelly, Towards Another Shore, p. 128.

[62] Ibid., p. 126; Offord, Opposition to Autocracy, pp. 66-81.

[63] Offord, Opposition to Autocracy, p. 69.

[64] Ibid., p. 71.

[65] Kelly, Towards Another Shore, p. 125.

[66] Frank, Mantle of the Prophet, pp. 65-86.

[67] Ibid., p. 85.

[68] Kelly, Towards Another Shore, pp. 91-118.

[69] Frank, Miraculous Years, pp. 435-72.

[70] As noted by Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, p. 147.

[71] Frank, Miraculous Years, pp. 365-8.

[72] Dostoevsky, Demons, p. 689.

[73] Dostoevsky, A Writer’s Diary, p. 69.

[74] Morson, ‘Tradition and Counter-Tradition’, p. 143.

[75] Frank, Miraculous Years, pp. 477-80.

[76] Dostoevsky, A Writer’s Diary, p. 65.

Sarcasm and compassion: Reginald Scot on witchcraft

Possibly the start of a series of essays that remain significant to my fiction writing. I have a few of these, that I felt passionately about — or thought passionately in; and that creep into my story themes — or try. First up, Reginald Scot and The Discoverie of Witchcraft, written for a Witch-Hunting unit in History.

I saw Scot in relation to the Elizabethan and Jacobean stage — both comedy and tragedy, and playwrights’ presentation of human evil. Nods to Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, Iago, and my fave, The Changeling.

Next up: my What is Tragedy? essay, if I dare after I re-read it.

Sarcasm, compassion and the stage: Reginald Scot on witchcraft

 

MEPHISTOPHELES Why, this is hell, nor am I out of it.
– Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, Act 1, Scene 3, line 76

And if there be a hell upon earth, it is to be found in a melancholy man’s heart.
– Robert Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, Partition 1, Section 4, Member 1

This essay looks at Reginald Scot’s strategy and tactics as a writer in the Discoverie of Witchcraft. His strategy is to expose ‘cousenage’, from the physical tricks of legerdemain to the belief structures of demonologists. If he can unmask the one, can he not un-construct the other? Merely bracketing the jugglers and the intellectuals in his screed against cozenage works like the strategy of a play where comic subplot is associated with tragic main plot. One tactic Scot shares with Elizabethan and Jacobean playwrights is witty speech – the provocation of laughter, by which he exposes absurdity, both in the concept of witchcraft and in the trial of witches. The playwrights are justly accused of failure to seriously engage with the contemporary topic of the witch-hunt; but they did seriously engage with the question of evil. Scot’s main enemy is the sense of Satan’s presence in the world, and his answer can be seen in the light of stage plays that treat of evil and its human agents.

Scot’s witty speech is involved with his attacks on the absurd: when his sarcasm effects a smile, then the illogic he points to is killed with humour along with contempt. Sarcasm is not low wit for Scot, not beneath him; neither is the pun; the anti-Catholic joke is a given.1 His sallies seek to clinch an argument by amusement or thrust a point home on his rapier wit: witty speech is his most ready weapon. He lampoons demonologists even as he draws out their arguments to absurd conclusions, extrapolates from what they say to use their own logic against them. He is often funny to read. This has not been enough noticed; perhaps the humour is thought an adjunct to his argument, a delivery system, rather than being an integral part of the missile itself.2

Where else in the sources can humour be found? Stuart Clark in his grand analysis of demonologists’ language does not identify humorous weapons in their arsenal; his section on ‘wit-craft’ is about clever speech, not about wit as upon the stage; the only humours in the learned writings of his study are the medical understanding of the day; laughter, it seems, was not a tool of his intellectual demonologists.3 Certainly ‘M. Mal.’ and Jean Bodin, ‘their principall doctors’ for Scot, do not construct their case by wit. Possibly wit is more suited to deconstruction, to the sceptic. Marion Gibson takes English pamphlets as her study, and finds that even the grave ones can feature humour; furthermore, there is a category of ‘triviall’ pamphlets which treat witchcraft frivolously, at a time when people are being hanged and the public is supposed to be in the grip of fear of witches. Gibson asks us not to neglect this ‘trivial’ evidence of another attitude Elizabethans and Jacobeans had towards witches.4

Comedy in the circumstances may challenge our understanding, but the same can be said for comic subplots in the Elizabethan play. In these the comic and the earnest cohabit, often uneasily to us. Like Clark’s festivals of misrule, the stage comedy and the comic subplot in a serious play can incline either to conserve or to subvert the order of the establishment (whatever that is in the context of the play).5 On stage, comedy can be tipped towards the conservative or the subversive by a performance, and of course by its audience. Festivals of misrule were live performances, too.

Performances of Doctor Faustus used tricks from Scot’s repertoire for its stage effects of magic. This play’s stage Lucifer, its machinery of devils, its close imitation of conjuration in the theatre, can be played for fear even to a post-Christian audience.6 But the stagedness may be fatal to earnest fear. If the devil on stage is a thing of masks, of smoke and mirrors, perhaps the off-stage devil is questioned, deflated, seen (if only for a moment of confusion) as spectacle. Scot equates jugglery with conjuration to mock the latter. In the case of Doctor Faustus, comedy infiltrates the main plot: audiences are invited to laugh with Faustus and Mephistopheles as they bamboozle the corrupt pope in Rome and the silly emperor of Germany. Anti-Catholicism opens a crack; it is a wedge exploited by Doctor Faustus and by the Discoverie of Witchcraft. A devil play that laughs with Mephistopheles through half of the action pulls in different directions; the opportunity to thumb one’s nose at Europe allows in what Stuart Clark calls ‘the relativity of the devil.’7 Clark identifies an opportunity in the new plurality of confessional faiths – when the church is not one edifice. Of course, it is not sufficient to be anti-Catholic to achieve a distance from the witchcraft construct. As Scot observes himself, one piece of that construct can be questioned, disproved, yet other pieces remain intact and the construct knits together again in people’s brains.8 Christopher Marlowe has been reputed an atheist; Reginald Scot has been reputed a member of the Family of Love.9 Whether or not either speculation has truth, both are taken for radicals in their work. Marlowe’s Faustus has also been interpreted as a conservative and truly Christian play, but it is a send-up, it is not a sermon.10

Scot employs the send-up, in that he particularises the opposition’s beliefs (his ‘inventory of devils’) and extrapolates from those beliefs with the ‘what if?’ question, until they are exposed as absurd. One of his counter-arguments is to point out that if witches’ impossibilities were possible, these decrepit old women would much more resemble the great stage Satanist, the learned doctor, Faustus. Like him, they would advise princes, muster imaginary armies out of the air, and obtain for themselves fabulous wealth. Furthermore, the kingdoms of Europe would be in chaos – with thousands of Doctor Faustuses at large. Does this resemble reality? he asks. The misrule that must ensue were witches real is like the slapstick scenes of Doctor Faustus, in every prince’s court.11

In addition, Scot brackets illogic with injustice. When he critiques the conduct of witch trials, he brings out the absurdities. Magistrates too are cozened, by procedure he unpicks as illogical – including torture which he attacks as absurd too, so that miscarriages of justice must be the result.12 Witchcraft cannot be seen as irrational belief; the trouble is it was rational by the thought structures of the day.13 Stuart Clark explains it was locked in by the structures of language, by which a contrary had to exist (if God, then Satan) and where logical extension was sufficient to convince people, above evidence, in the face of evidence.14 Scot is aware of the obstinacy of belief, upon which simple disproofs do not work.15 He addresses his book to the magistracy of England among other intelligent men: he knows witchcraft makes sense to persons of reason.16 His attacks on its logic, from his ‘let us assume it true’ extrapolations, to his argumentation as to why torture does not detect the guilty, are an attempt to dismantle pieces of the thought-world that makes witchcraft in his time a rational proposition. To point out the preposterous, to ridicule, or better, to construct a ridiculous case by the opposition’s own logic; to make men laugh at a facet of the false beliefs: this is his way forward, into a ‘time to come’ when witch beliefs ‘will be as much derided and contemned, and as plainlie perceived’ as the goblins once believed in.17

To banish God’s great contrary the devil, with his hosts of demons as against the host of angels, from the world, from activity on earth, might require both feats of logic to unpick how people think, and an address to their human recognition of the accused human agents of the devil. Scot comes back again and again to the trope of ‘potable babies’ – infants’ flesh rendered down into a soup that may be drunk.18 The idea of potable babies stands for Scot as the great unlikelihood. When one looks at an old woman in court and imagines she has made a hundred babies potable – then that is such a failure of human recognition as staggers Scot’s mind. He simply attempts to point out its obvious impossibility on another level, a level of sane thought as to what people do and what is too wicked for people to be doing, by the thousands, in our own neighbourhoods.

On human recognition, he has an ally in the playwrights. There are trivialisations of witchcraft that modern persons find difficult to excuse: Diane Purkiss says Shakespeare scholars go into interpretive contortions to make of his three Weird Sisters in Macbeth a significant commentary on the subject. In her investigation of Elizabethan and Jacobean drama she finds no more serious, or more sympathetic, stage witch extant. Our greatest playwright has failed us.19 However, let us not forget, the witch is personified evil. Attention is directed to Satan, while the witch is the one with malice towards other humans, neighbours, who chooses to perform these foul acts – the acts Scot disbelieves as inhuman, not humanly possible, on the scale imagined. Scot expends his pen on what is not an intellectual demonologist’s argument, but is about the acceptance of a dangerous fantasy as to deeds our neighbours do in their homes. This fantasy of evil, detached from real observation, to which intellectuals are at least as subject as other folk, he sees perpetuated by scare tactics, both demonologists’ literature and old wives’ tales fed to us early (if Scot is elitist in his scorn for ‘what our low-class nurses told us’, as Purkiss charges, he has equal contempt for the knowledge structures of the learned).20 This is the crux of the matter. The witch was personified evil in that on trial for her life was a person, accused of huge malignancy, an exaggerated wickedness.

When playwrights present an individual figure of evil actions and ask why, this too can be acknowledged a response to witchcraft. Iago is Shakespeare’s treatment of the perplexity of evil in human guise. To stage an Iago, and puzzle the audience as to why he ruins lives, must be seen as topical. Elizabethan and Jacobean playwrights did engage deeply with questions of evil. From Kyd’s Spanish Tragedy (1580s) to Middleton’s The Changeling (1622) – also in Spain, although Italy was popular – tragedies were set in Catholic lands where the playwrights could not only stage sensational action, with the anti-Catholic tropes of poisoning and illicit sex, but discuss evil’s place in the world and its existential position. In The Changeling, De Flores is a figure for the devil: a fallen gentleman, of ugly visage, Beatrice’s servant who, when engaged by her to perform a wicked piece of work, becomes her master, and for his end of the bargain demands sexual intercourse with her. This is the very devil’s pact of witches, although Purkiss only attends to Middleton’s direct portrayal in his comedy The Witch.

It is witches in the real world who suffer this being personified – being caught up in the contraries Stuart Clark analyses, whereby Satan was inflated to be (almost) God’s equal and opposite, and oppositional faiths were locked into a language of antagonism, into extremist positions.21 There was no room in such a totalising of evil, a totalising of the opposition, to be an ill-favoured, nasty old woman and not be of the devil’s party – a witch. De Flores is typecast into his devil figuration by his face. As a matter of fact it is Beatrice who tempts De Flores, to whom he succumbs: she assumes that a foul face is made for criminal work, and it is his exclusion from the opportunity to woo her in any other fashion – because of his ugliness – that leads him to agree. From there, evil actions are contagious, the contamination has set in. If a Kentish wife can be mad and yet not of the devil, if a crotchety old woman can curse her neighbour and yet not go home to practice dark arts upon him, then there is that ‘gradation’ that Clark sees as lost to the language and its conceptual structures.22 One thing leads to another, in the rhetoric of the day. Purkiss thinks Scot insults the crotchety old women,23 but this is not to the point; it is important that he does champion those hard to champion, those most easily categorised in the extreme of evil. If a petty affront, then a major crime: this is the thinking he wants to undo. It would not achieve his purpose to exempt the victims of witch trials from eccentricity, difficult tempers, distempers of the mind or ugly faces.

These are the people in danger. The Changeling has sympathy for the devil in that De Flores begins as an unfortunate whose preoccupation with Beatrice is not less to be called love than the emotions of her suitors. Macbeth has no sympathy for its witches, but the playwrights make it their business to humanise the agents of evil (it is in Lady Macbeth, or Macbeth himself, we might better look for comment). This of course is to work against the demonising of people. The demonologists, quite simply, demonise people, Scot finds, by their intellectual structures and their use/misuse of evidence. A person cannot be half bad in the contraries structure of Clark, whether Calvinist or Catholic; and herein lies the danger to the vulnerable of society, who are already seen as half bad or a quarter bad or a difficulty to the community. The thrust of a plot like The Changeling’s speaks to the inevitability of a mildly disassociated person like De Flores falling further – and this because of people’s expectations of him. Macbeth and Lady Macbeth undergo this progress into evil. Must a poor Essex woman, turned away at a door, inevitably be led by her rancour into the stereotypes that await her as a witch? Scot attempts to say no.

If Shakespeare does not grasp the nettle of the witch trials, directly, then neither do other admired writers, Robert Burton (1577-1640) with his Anatomy of Melancholy and Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) in his essays. For Burton, a witch may cause or be caused by melancholy, but he has nothing to say about melancholics misunderstood and on trial for their lives; Montaigne once meets accused witches and vaunts his strict impartiality of mind; he does not go on to write an essay on the witch-hunt.24 Both authors deal largely with what is Scot’s main defence: the psychological explanation, ‘the force of imagination’, and the sick imagination of melancholy.25 Scot rests on the medical doctor Weyer for his understanding, but he finds in melancholy madness a sufficient explanation even for cases he has witnessed. Burton writes feeling pages upon self-harm as the main ‘prognostic’ for the melancholy condition; Montaigne writes an anecdotal essay on people’s strange readiness to die.26 For Scot, such gleaned information (he and Burton in particular share authorities) demolished any difficulty posed by those cases where witches voluntarily cast themselves into the arms of the law – judicial suicide.27 As to that sad phenomenon, self-cozened witches, a book like Burton’s – a catalogue of mental illness – easily explains these, and Scot is convinced.28 His ideal story is that of the Kentish husband who so compassionately opposes his wife’s belief that she is a witch and has done harm.29 If only every woman self-abused to self-accuse were possessed of such a husband, Scot seems to say. Without him, she would have been hanged; just as, if Job’s story happened now, ‘a few old women would hang for it’ – this line or its similar is one of Scot’s themes, inserted as a chorus to his song.30 It has his traits as a writer: angry under an off-hand phrase, with scorn and compassion at work together.

Sarcasm and the argument by absurdity can be seen as a sceptic’s weapons, if Scott’s demonological opposition are conceded to have little humour. Judicial procedure against witches is also absurd in Scot’s hands: he scoffs at the illogic in the construct of witchcraft and in its proofs in court. Scot champions the victims of witch trials in their sickness, ugliness, or their common human malice; and this restores what Stuart Clark calls ‘gradation’ – the avoidance of absolutes. Sympathy for the (human) devil is almost unavoidable in a well-written tragedy like Othello, Macbeth or The Changeling, where evil action is seen in gradual steps and does not explain the whole of the personality. Scot’s most sentimental stories tend to this end, as does his pity for the unfortunate.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Burton, Robert. The Anatomy of Melancholy. Ed., Holbrook Jackson. New York: New York Review Books, 2001.

Marlowe, Christopher. Doctor Faustus and Other Plays. Eds., David Bevington and Eric Rasmussen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Middleton, Thomas and Rowley, William. The Changeling, in Three Jacobean Tragedies. Ed., Gamini Salgado. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969.

Montaigne, Michel de. Essays. Trans., John Florio. 1603. Renascence Editions: http://www.luminarium.org/renascence-editions, accessed 30 March 2016.

Russell, Ian (director). Doctor Faustus (video recording). London: Globe Theatre On Screen, Opus Arte, 2012.

Scot, Reginald. The Discoverie of Witchcraft. New York: Dover, 1972.

 
Secondary works

Almond, Philip C. England’s First Demonologist: Reginald Scot and the ‘Discoverie of Witchcraft’. London and New York: I B Taurus, 2011.

Clark, Stuart. Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Davies, S.F., ‘The reception of Reginald Scot’s Discoverie of Witchcraft: Witchcraft, magic and radical religion’ Journal of the History of Ideas 74 (No. 3, 2013), pp. 381-401.

Gibson, Marion. Reading Witchcraft: Stories of Early English Witches. London and New York: Routledge, 1999.

Hopkins, Lisa. Christopher Marlowe: A Literary Life. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000.

Purkiss, Diane. The Witch in History: Early Modern and Twentieth-century Representations. London and New York: Routledge, 1996.

Wootton, David, ‘Reginald Scot/Abraham Fleming/The Family of Love’, in Languages of Witchcraft: Narrative, Ideology and Meaning in Early Modern Culture, pp. 119-138. Ed., Stuart Clark. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001.

Footnotes
1 Reginald Scot, The Discoverie of Witchcraft (New York: Dover, 1972). Examples of sarcasm in III xv, IV ii; of puns in III iv; of anti-Catholic jokes in III ii, IV iii. Passim.
2 His humour is not discussed in Philip C. Almond, England’s First Demonologist: Reginald Scot and the ‘Discoverie of Witchcraft’ (London and New York: I B Taurus, 2011), or in the other works consulted for this essay.
3 Stuart Clark, Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
4 Marion Gibson, Reading Witchcraft: Stories of Early English Witches (London and New York: Routledge, 1999); for ‘trivial’ pamphlets, see pp. 113-49.
5 For festivals of misrule, see Clark, Thinking with Demons, pp. 11-30.
6 Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, A-text, 1604; for a performance which seeks to recreate Elizabethan stage machinery and effects, see Ian Russell (director), Doctor Faustus, video recording (London: Globe Theatre On Screen, 2012).
7 Clark, Thinking with Demons, pp. 134-48.
8 Scot, Discoverie, I vi.
9 Arguments for and against Scot’s Family of Love connection found in David Wootton, ‘Reginald Scot/Abraham Fleming/The Family of Love’, in Languages of Witchcraft: Narrative, Ideology and
Meaning in Early Modern Culture, ed., Stuart Clark (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001), pp. 119-138; S.F.
Davies, ‘The reception of Reginald Scot’s Discoverie of Witchcraft: Witchcraft, magic and radical
religion’, Journal of the History of Ideas 74 (No. 3, 2013), pp. 396-401.
10 For the debates on Marlowe’s atheism and the play’s Christianity, see Lisa Hopkins, Christopher
Marlowe: A Literary Life (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 65-84.
11 Scot, Discoverie, III viii and xiv, parallels Doctor Faustus, Acts 3 and 4.
12 Scot frequently touches on torture; for example, II xii.
13 Clark is certainly not on his own but he states this strongly, Thinking with Demons, pp. 3-10.
14 Ibid., pp. 43-93.
15 Scot, Discoverie, I vi, again.
16 For the persons Scot dedicated the Discoverie to, and whose perusal he hoped for, see Almond,
England’s First Demonologist, pp. 1-20.
17 Scot, Discoverie, VII ii.
18 Ibid.; first mentioned II ix.
19 Diane Purkiss, The Witch in History: Early Modern and Twentieth-century Representations (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 179-230.
20 For Purkiss on Scot’s elitism, see Witch in History, p. 64.
21 Clark, Thinking with Demons, pp. 43-68.
22 Ibid., p. 61.
23 For Scot as misogynist, see Purkiss, Witch in History, p. 217.
24 Robert Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy; witches cause melancholy, Pt. 1, Sec. 2, Mem. 1, Subs. 3; witches are caused by melancholy, Subs. 6. Michel de Montaigne meets witches in his essay ‘Of Cripples’.
25 ‘Of the Force of Imagination’ is the title of an essay by Montaigne.
26 Burton, Anatomy, Pt. 1, Sec. 4, Mem. 1; Montaigne, ‘That the taste of Goods or Evils doth greatly depend on the opinion we have of them’.
27 Scot, Discoverie, III vii.
28 Burton, Anatomy, Pt. 1, Sec. 3; Scot, Discoverie, III vii-xi.
29 Ibid., III x.
30 Ibid., V viii.